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MITIGATION, MERCY, AND DELAY:




Thirteen years ago, I worked on the Capital Punishment Project of
the NAACP Legal Defense &, Educational Fund (LDF) representing capi-
tal defendants and death row inmates. In the early 1960s, LDF launched
a campaign to abolish capital punishment.1 Led by self-proclaimed "abo-
litionist" lawyers,2 the campaign pressed for both procedural reform and
substantive repeal of the death penalty.3 Today, thwarted by a retributive
politics clamoring for death in courts and legislatures, the litigation cam-
paign carries on more narrowly, attacking the procedure and application,
rather than the substantive immorality, of state-imposed death.
I recall many moments from the year at LDF: the summer heat of a
North Carolina prison, the cadences of a Louisiana cooperating attorney,
the scratched white walls of death row. But the moment I recall most
vividly came at the end of a cold December day upon learning of the
imminent death of a client, Robert Wayne Williams, in Angola, Louisi-
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law; A.B., Brown University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School
of Law, 1984. I am grateful to Adrian Barker, Katie Fallow, Greg Gibson, Ellen Grant,
Eden Harrington, Amelia Hope, Albert Kim, Michelle Kim, Julie Rikelman, Kevin
Reuther, and Brian Wong for their comments and support. I also wish to thank Marisa
Gerard, Sally Madigan, Marlene Rodriguez, Caryn Vogel, and the University of Miami
School of Law library staff for their research assistance.
This Article is dedicated to Gary Bellow.
I For a history of the LDF abolitionist campaign, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS
IN THE COURTS 440-60 (1994); MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SU-
PREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 60-72 (1973). See also HUGO A. BEDAU, THE
COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81-90 (1977); Jack Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982); Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal
Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign: The Distorting Influence of Death, 4 YALE
L. & PoL'y REv. 158 (1985).
2By "abolitionists," I mean civil rights and criminal defense lawyers committed to
the invalidation of the death penalty. Austin Sarat distinguishes between "old" and "new"
abolitionist lawyers. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996). Old abolitionists, Sarat observes, oppose the death
penalty on substantive, moral grounds. New abolitionists, by contrast, oppose the death
penalty on procedural, legal grounds. Id.
Because of the instrumentalist orientation shared by "old" and "new" abolitionists, I
reject Sarat's sociohistorical distinction. Instead, I use the term "abolitionists" to refer
generally to the anti-capital punishment bar. See Franklin E. Zinring, On the Liberating
Wrtues ofIrrelevance, 27 LAW & Soc'y REv. 9, 15 (1993) (discussing the significance of
empirical evidence documenting the emergence of a capital punishment bar).
3 See GREENBERG, supra note 1, at 440-60; MELTSNER, supra note 1, at 60-72.
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ana.4 Throughout that long day at LDF, no one held vigil. The work
required its own vigilance. When word came of the scheduled execution,
no one prayed. The work entailed its own secular prayer. Later, past
nightfall, having exhausted hope of clemency or a stay, no one invoked
moral community. The work assembled its own community. The next day,
no one mourned. The work did not allow it.
Thirteen years ago, I wondered aloud how abolitionists could suffer
the pain of witnessing death without consecration. I wondered how they
could struggle to forge litigation strategy without hearing or disclosing
client moral voice. I wondered how they could sustain their cause without
constitutional sanction. I wondered, finally, how they could prevail in their
campaign without a wider moral community.
Capital punishment litigation occurs within a pluralist moral commu-
nity consisting of lawyers and lay advocates, capital clients and their
families, legislators, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and executioners. In the-
ory, all of these communities stand accessible to abolitionist moral dis-
course. In practice, however, many decline to hear or to participate in that
discourse. Recoiling from the Williams execution, I wondered how to
speak to those silent communities, how to find words to turn away death.
Thirteen years ago I resolved to take up such questions. This Article
presents a long-distilled, albeit hesitant and no doubt incomplete, first
effort. I confess hesitation at the outset for fear that many in or allied
with the anti-capital punishment bar may consider this effort misguided.
For twenty years, courts, legislatures, and public opinion have besieged
the abolitionist position, accelerating the pace and number of executions.
Abolitionists decry this race to death and the incompetence of counsel
that mars its spectacle. To raise controversial issues of abolitionist politics
under these circumstances may strike some as absurd, akin to Justice
Scalia's recent exhortation to the anti-capital punishment bar to "Try
harder' 5 in its already tireless struggle to advocate and to secure compe-
4 See Fay S. Joyce, One Slayer Executed, with Another to Die Today, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
15, 1983, at A22. The Williams litigation is well accounted in the legal record. See
Williams v. Maggio, 383 So. 2d 369 (La.), 387 So. 2d 598 (La. 1980), cert. denied sub
noin. Williams v. Louisiana, 449 U.S. 1103, and reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 971 (1981); State
ex rel. Williams v. Blackburn, 396 So. 2d 1249 (La.), Williams v. Blackburn, No.
81-237-B, slip op. (M.D. La.), 649 E2d 1019 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 661 F.2d 1020 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd on reh'g, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Williams
v. Maggio, 463 U.S. 1214, and reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1249 (1983); Williams v. King, 439
So. 2d 1092 (La. 1983); Williams v. King, 573 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. La.), aff'd 719 F.2d
729 (5th Cir.) (granting stay of execution), 719 E2d 730 (5th Cir.) (same), Maggio v.
Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (vacating stay), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. King, 464
U.S. 1027 (1983) (denying stay), State ex rel. Williams v. King, 442 So. 2d 473 (La.
1983),722 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
5 United States Supreme Court Official Tr. at 7, McFarland v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 2568
(1994) (No. 93-6497) (Scalia, J.).
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tent counsel for capital defendants and death row inmates. Yet, the call to
reflection is compelling, especially in times of crisis.
This Article summons an answer to that call, offering a preliminary
reflection on the politics of abolitionist lawyering. By politics, I mean a
vision of law practice that both describes the activities and prescribes the
norms of representation. 6 For abolitionist lawyers in the post-Furman7 era,
the modem era of constitutionalized death,8 the daily activities of repre-
sentation are no longer bound up in the pursuit of a nationwide morato-
rium strategy to halt executions. Instead, lawyers engage in a case-by-case
triage strategy to save one life at a time.9 Put simply, the normative goal
is to keep the client alive. 10
To make the case for life, abolitionists employ the twin strategies of
mitigation and delay. During the penalty or sentencing phase of capital
trials, lawyers present mitigating evidence of client psycho-social depri-
vation to the jury in an attempt to explain specific violent acts of criminal
lawbreaking and, thus, invite mercy. Likewise, to delay death at post-con-
viction proceedings, lawyers present and sometimes re-present mitigation-
linked evidence of client deprivation in direct state appeals, certiorari
petitions, successive state and federal habeas corpus filings, stay requests,
and executive clemency pleas. These mitigation-linked pleadings also
work to invite mercy. Although intended as supplications of mercy, the
strategies of mitigation and delay profoundly shape the moral vision of
abolitionist lawyers. Indeed, to post-Furman abolitionists, the deprivation
histories of penalty phase mitigation and the mitigation-linked calcula-
tions of post-conviction delay furnish alternative measures of political and
personal accomplishment."
Both the trial and post-conviction contexts of state-imposed death
demand that abolitionist lawyers exercise normative judgment. Abolition-
ists regularly confront judgments, for example, about the content of miti-
gating evidence at trial and the legitimacy of mitigation-linked claims
raised during post-conviction relief proceedings. 12 The norms of mitiga-
6 For elaboration on the notion of a practice vision, see William H. Simon, The Dark
Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-
Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1099 (1994) (assailing new poverty law
scholars); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469
(1984) (comparing professional and critical views of practice).
7 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8 For surveys of death penalty litigation developments in the post-Furman era, see
Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797 (1986); Franklin E.
Zimring, Inheriting the Wind: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s,
20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7 (1992).
9 See generally Sarat, supra note 2.
10 See generally id.
" See generally id.
12 A third, less frequently encountered judgment involves the abolitionist response to
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tion, mercy, and delay inform those judgments and dictate the result-ori-
ented politics of instrumentalism that pervades current abolitionist prac-
tice.
Instrumentalism expresses a vision of practice animated by claims of
purposive and practical advocacy.' 3 The claim of purposivism assumes the
normative autonomy of lawyers from clients and society.14 This premise
gives lawyers the room and the authority to maneuver outside of client
will and societal constraint. The room to maneuver is limited. If the
lawyer ventures too far beyond client intent or societal conveition, he
risks illegitimacy. Still, lawyer-client decisional boundaries generally lie
unclear and client-delegated authority normally issues broadly. Vagueness
and overbreadth thus combine to enable abolitionist lawyers to exercise
discretion in making judgments of litigation strategy independent of cli-
ents, the state, and society.
The claim of practicality assumes that strategic litigation judgments
may be reached through a lawyer's contextual application of neutral,
problem-solving skills that purport to operate objectively, generalizing
differences of client race and class in producing mitigation evidence at
trial and mitigation-linked evidence on post-conviction review. Robin West
points to evidentiary production of this sort in the defense narrative of a
capital defendant's "life story."'" This narrative implies neutral and objec-
tive findings of psychosocial deprivation, assigning criminal blame and
responsibility to societal causes external to the capital defendant. For
West, that assignment minimizes, even excludes, moral responsibility for
criminality.16 Interweaving the norms of community, connection, and re-
sponsibility, West emphasizes "the very real need to assign and then
the decision of a capital defendant' or a death row inmate to elect voluntary execution. The
literature discussing the nature of this judgment is sparse. See Kathleen L. Johnson, Note,
The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575
(1981); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the
Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983); Welsh
S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 853 (1987); Richard C.
Dieter, Note, Ethical Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 799 (1990).
13 In a prior work, I engrafted the notion of instrumentalism onto a vision of law
practice carried out in the context of poverty. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2619-39 (1993) (discussing the formal/instrumental tension
in the politics of poverty law practice).
"aThe claim of purposivism also assumes the relative autonomy of law and lawyers
from the political state. The premise of relative autonomy sees law and lawyers pushed
internally by the imperatives of professional ideology and legal reasoning, and pulled
externally by the forces of politics, society, and economics. Out of this tension emerges
a middle ground or space open to doctrinal evolution and to lawyer maneuver. Typically,
the evolution is incremental and the maneuver is small in scale.
15Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death: A Comment on the Death Penalty
Cases from the 1989 Term, 1 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 167 (1990).
161d, at 174.
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acknowledge both individual and societal responsibility for the conse-
quences of actions."' 7 Imbued by the narrative of societal deprivation, the
claim of practicality offers an impoverished interpretation of moral re-
sponsibility for criminality.
Instrumentalist advocacy fails to strengthen the moral force of the
abolitionist cause. Although abolitionists oppose state-sanctioned violence,
they yield to a politics of instrumentalism in legal advocacy. In this
Article, I argue that lawyers waging post-Furman abolitionist campaigns
sacrifice the moral voice of capital clients to the politics of instrumental-
ism, and therefore silence the empathic narrative of moral community.
The shift from moral descant to legal instrumentalism occupies two
ongoing historical waves or movements in the post-Furman ab6litionist
campaign. Across individual cases, the movements appear coextensive, at
other times sequential. In the first wave, abolitionists express their moral
opposition through the instrumental strategies of mitigation and mitiga-
tion-linked delay situated within the evolving jurisprudence of the Eighth
Amendment. In the second wave, they move to legitimize mitigation and
delay by means of alternative constitutional and ethical inscription, en-
trenching the strategies in a Sixth Amendment professional command-
ment, and failing that, a professional ethic of effective assistance of
capital counsel.
Both mitigation and delay strategies silence the moral voice and
community of the capital client. Silencing permits a retributive politics of
morality to infect judicial, legislative, and media treatment of civil rights
and criminal laws, thereby weakening the constitutional and statutory
protections that shield capital defendants and death row inmates from
cruel and unusual punishment. In civil rights law, this retributive politics
generates arbitrariness and inequality. In criminal law, it engenders bru-
tality and death. To reverse these trends, I urge abolitionist lawyers to
reconceive a client/community-centered politics of morality tailored to
the context of death penalty litigation.
The Article is divided into three parts. Part I describes the first wave
of the abolitionist campaign to transform moral politics into the instru-
mental strategies of mitigation and delay. Section A discusses the trial
strategy of mitigation. Section B considers the post-conviction strategy of
delay.
Part II examines the second wave of the abolitionist crusade to configure
moral politics into instrumental strategies of effective assistance of coun-
sel in capital cases. Section A explores the effort to constitutionalize the
jurisprudence of effective assistance. Section B analyzes the attempt to
professionalize that jurisprudence in the form of an ethical canon. Section
17 d. at 167.
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C evaluates the tendency of abolitionist ethical judgments to silence the
moral voice of capital defendants and death row inmates at trial and on
post-conviction review.
Part III proposes reconstructing the moral politics of abolitionist
litigation under the norms of moral agency and community. Section A
contemplates the limits and possibilities of moral discourse in capital
cases. Section B exposes the elements of moral agency within the vic-
timization-agency dichotomy embedded in the strategies of mitigation and
delay. Section C encourages a vision of moral community in abolitionist
practice.
I. First Wave Moral Politics: Instrumental Strategies of Mitigation and
Delay
Understanding the moral politics of current abolitionist litigation,
both descriptively and normatively, requires an understanding of specific
practice contexts.18 In the post-Furman era, abolitionists embrace a moral
politics of form rooted in the instrumental strategies of mitigation and
delay. This politics of form and tactical maneuver omits the substantive
import of moral agency and community. In this Section, I trace the first
wave of abolitionist instrumental practices in trial and post-conviction
proceedings.
A. The Trial Strategy of Mitigation
The abolitionist trial strategy of mitigation arises out of the con-
stitutional jurisprudence of the Eighth Amendment. This jurisprudence
breaks down into two doctrinal strands: channeling and individualiza-
tion.19 Post-Furman courts and legislatures have translated these doctrines
into two dominant state capital sentencing schemes: weighing and non-
weighing.2
0
18For illustrations of context-specific analysis, see GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (ethnicity);
Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Exploring Hierarchy and
"Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991) (gender); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF.
L. REv. 1 (1990) (race/class).
19Carol and Jordon Steiker describe the tension between channeling and individuali-
zation as "the central dilemma in post-Furman capital punishment law." Carol S. Steiker
& Jordon M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitu-
tional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995).20 On the character of weighing and non-weighing schemes, see Scott E. Sundby, The
Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital
Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (1991); Srikanth Srinivasan, Note, Capital Sentencing
Doctrine and the Weighing-Noniveighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1347 (1995).
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Weighing schemes,21 originally upheld in Gregg v. Georgia22 and its
companion cases,23 embody the doctrine of guided discretion. State stat-
utes guide, or channel, discretion by suitably directing the sentencer to
balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining the eli-
gibility of a defendant for death.24 Non-weighing schemes, initially ap-
proved in Woodson v. North Carolina25 and Lockett v. Ohio,26 incorporate
the doctrine of individualized sentencing. 27 Woodson linked the require-
ment of individualization to the consideration of mitigating factors.28 Lockett
amplified this requirement, recognizing a defendant's right to present and
a sentencer's duty to consider mitigating evidence relating to any aspect
of a defendant's character or record. 29 Extending Lockett's mandate, Penry
v. Lynaugh ° added that mitigating evidence may include reference to a
defendant's mental disorder, physical abuse, and social deprivation.31
The moral and strategic purpose of mitigation evidence is to evoke
mercy in the jury. Abolitionists relate mitigation and mercy to the pres-
entation of a human narrative. 32 Humanizing the voice of the capital
21 Weighing statutory schemes predominate in 21 of 36 state death penalty jurisdic-
tions. See Stephen Hornbuckle, Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in
the Supreme Court's Case Law, 73 T)x. L. Rev. 441, 448 n.38 (1994).
22428 U.S. 153 (1976).
23 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).24 For an analysis of channeling schemes and jury discretion, see James Luginbuhl &
Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND.
L.J. 1161 (1995).
25428 U.S. 280 (1976).
26438 U.S. 586 (1978). For an explanation of Lockett's importance, see Randy Hertz
& Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital
Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317
(1981).
27 See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the Death
Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REv. 493 (1992); Carol S. Steiker
& Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement
in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835 (1992).
28 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (describing "the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
29 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; accord Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see
also JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 172 (1994) (asserting that the "major source" of juror
discretion stems from the assessment of the defendant's character and violent propensi-
ties).
30492 U.S. 302 (1989).
31 1d. at 307-10, 328; see also Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought?:
Mitigating Circumstances and the Texas Death Penalty, 19 AM. J. CPIM. L. 345, 355-64
(1992) (evaluating constitutional adequacy of Texas death penalty statutory provisions
regulating consideration of mitigating circumstances).32 See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. Rev. 305, 361; see also
Albert L. Vreeland, Note, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations
and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 626 (1991).
Vreeland explains:
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defendant, they contend, acts to counter the prosecutorial image of an
"irredeemably evil person" 33 preternaturally "hostile to civilized values"
and "devoid of human sensibilities" 34 To convey this image, the prosecu-
tor must call up images of defendant-inflicted violence,35 depicting a
"sociologically simple world of good and evil" where "responsibility and
desert" count.36 Cultural demonization affords defense counsel an oppor-
tunity37 to humanize the capital defendant.
38
The presentation of mitigating evidence to humanize the capital client
acquires a common form and substance under the channeling and indi-
vidualization strands of Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence.
At trial, during the penalty phase, mitigating evidence usually inhabits the
form of story recited on behalf of the defendant by family, friends, neigh-
bors, teachers, and mental health professionals (psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, and social workers). Borrowing from the social science literature of
victimization, the story characterizes a defendant's life history as one of
physical abuse39 and mental disorder.
40
Humanizing the client requires research into personal history from birth to trial,
interviewing family, neighbors, teachers, ministers, employers and anyone with
significant contact with the defendant. These witnesses must be presented to the
jury to tell the defendant's story, to make sense of the client's life and to explain
how he came to commit the crime.
Id. at 649.33 Weisberg, supra note 32, at 361.34See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE
L,J. 825, 852 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)).
35 See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The
View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1122 (1995).
36Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAw
& Soc'Y REV. 19, 51 (1993).
37A similar opportunity arises in clemency proceedings, albeit with growing infre-
quency. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 29, at 102; Hugo A. Bedau, The Decline of
Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990/1991).
38Stephen Schulhofer comments:
Cultural demonization of the criminal offender provides the emotional energy to
condemn without remorse and eventually to pull the lethal switch, but it also
leaves a large opening for defense counsel, because that picture of the generic
Mobster or Mugger seldom corresponds to the facts of the particular case. If a
guilty criminal is defined as a moral monster who deserves execution or isolation
from human society forever, then the individual on trial-a three-dimensional
person with human frailties and human needs-probably will not fit the picture
Schulhofer, supra note 34, at 852.39 See Sarat, supra note 36, at 39-47; see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
51-74 (1987).
40 On the use of mental disorders as mitigating evidence, see William Green, Capital
Punishnent, Psychiatric Experts and Predictions of Dangerousness, 13 CAPITAL U. L.
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Victimization theory provides defense counsel with "a causal, deter-
minist explanation" of the defendant's crime.41 Making an evidentiary
record of abuse, neglect, and disorder expands the field of material fact,
effectively indicting the defendant's family and social history.42 When
effective, determinist theory builds a "narrative chain" of events chroni-
cling a defendant's abusive childhood, delinquent youth, and adult crimi-
nal behavior.43 To the extent that this narrative helps explain the impact
of life events on a defendant's conduct, social scientists suggest that it
may serve "to justify compassion, sympathy, and mercy by jurors." 44 In
this way, mitigation evidence seeks to introduce the quality of mercy into
capital sentencing.
Doubtless, the mitigation strategy of humanizing the capital defen-
dant through a narrative of victimization oftentimes persuades juries to
forego the sentence of death. Nonetheless, in a significant number of
cases, the strategy proves fruitless. Full explication of this result requires
a theory of jury decision making 45 well beyond the scope of this inquiry.
At a minimum, the theory must ascertain whether juries understand vic-
timization-based mitigation evidence, 46 and, if so, whether they possess
the ability and willingness to find that such evidence provides the moral
justification for mercy or devolves into a moral excuse deserving of
death.47 Linking, by empirical or anecdotal evidence, a sentence of death
to a finding of moral excuse warrants reconsideration of the efficapy of
REV. 533 (1984); James Liebman & Michael Shephard, Guiding Sentencer Discretion
Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757
(1978); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper
Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409,
418-29 (1990); cf. EMILY F. REED, PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFEND-
ERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 17, 42-43 (1993) (discussing mental retardation as a
mitigating factor).
41Weisberg, supra note 32, at 361.
421d.
4 3 1d. at 381; see also Dorothy 0. Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and
Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986).
44Mark Costanzo & Julie Peterson, Attorney Persuasion in the Capital Penalty Phase:
A Content Analysis of Closing Arguments, 50 J. Soc. ISSUES 125, 134 (1994).45 For studies of capital jury decision making, see William J. Bowers, The Capital
Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995);
Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibil-
ity in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137 (1995).
46See Craig Haney, Taking Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1227 (1995)
(expressing skepticism that jurors understand either the significance of mitigating evidence
or its proper use in reaching a verdict); see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and
Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1.47 Marla Sandys reports that the majority of capital jurors make guilt and penalty
decisions concurrently, prior to the penalty phase of the trial. Concurrent decision making
not only vitiates the purpose of bifurcated proceedings, but "also precludes capital jurors
from basing their sentencing decisions on an evaluation of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances." See Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds
1996]
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the first strategic prong of abolitionist politics. The second prong fares no
better.
B. The Post-Conviction Strategy of Delay
At state and federal post-conviction proceedings, deprived of a con-
stitutional guarantee of counsel 48 and governed by the doctrine of effective
assistance, 49 abolitionists adopt a strategy of delay. Deploying collateral
procedural devices, primarily successive habeas corpus and stay petitions,
they struggle to slow the execution process"0 in order to discover evidence
sufficient to obtain a new trial or a lesser sentence.51 Delay in this respect
is attributable to an effort to retry, supplement, or improve mitigation
evidence.
Overall, capital proceedings reflect two preponderant forms of delay:
institutional and strategic. Institutional delay stems from an abolitionist
lawyer's effort to discharge his defensive duty to compel the prosecution
About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183,
1220-21 (1995).
48See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987). But see Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis
on Death Row, 37 Ams. U. L. REV. 513 (1988); Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Convic-
tion Petitioners' Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process
Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455 (1989); Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano:
Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 211 (1990).
49 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984). But see Lissa Griffin, The Right
to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 32-35, 36-37 (1994);
Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty
Cases: A Report Containing the American Bar Association's Recommendations Concern-
ing Death Penalty Habeas Corpus and Related Materials from the American Bar Associa-
tion Criminal Justice Section's Project on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 40 Am. U. L.
REv. 1, 62-92 (1990). See generally Symposium, Toward a More Effective Right to
Assistance of Counsel, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-138 (1995).
5OSee Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) ("In a death case involving a first habeas petition, it is
fairly typical to consume a year on the appeal, although two years or more certainly is
not unheard of."); see also Joseph B. Ingle, Final Hours: The Execution of Velma Barfield,
23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 221 (1989); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy
Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992).
51 See Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Representing the Death Row Inmate: The Ethics of
Advocacy, Collateral Style, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 92, 107 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989). Wollan remarks:
In death cases, at their very end, any amount of time, even an hour, might yield
a gain: information or witnesses may come forth, a decision may be rendered by
another court, a political change may occur in the system (such as appointment
of a new judge). Any one of these changes may happen within hours or days or
weeks of the inception of such a period of extension, thereby fundamentally
altering substantive or procedural advantages.
Id. at 107.
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to establish every element of its case.5 2 Ethical rules hold that this duty
regulates both pretrial and trial proceedings.53 To abolitionists, the same
duty applies to appellate and post-conviction proceedings. Embellishing
this duty, they strive to re-try the capital case to uncover evidence of error,
omission, or misconduct. Post-trial delay in this sense exists as an out-
growth of effective, quality criminal defense representation.
5 4
Strategic delay derives from an abolitionist lawyer's alternative at-
tempt to meet a heightened duty of advocacy55 through the filing of
multiple, and sometimes repetitive, habeas petitions and appeals. The
filing of successive state and federal petitions generates a recurrent cycle
of execution dates, applications, and stays.
56 The bid to raise "some issue 57
to delay the execution, however, may conflict with a lawyer's competing
obligation to demonstrate a legitimate basis58 for procedural maneuvers
that intentionally cause delay.5 9
The charge of illegitimacy, couched mainly in terms of frivolousness
and manipulation, resounds with increasing frequency and vehemence in
5 2 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983); see also CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1908) ("Having undertaken [the defense of a person
accused of a crime], the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every
defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life
or liberty, but by due process of law.").
5
3 See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL
IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 1.1 cmt., 2.1 cmt. (Feb. 1989); DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT RULES ANNOTATED Rule 3.1 (1995) (applying duty to contested
fact-finding hearing and trial).54 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2(b) (1994).
55 Section 4-1.2(c) of the Standards for Criminal Justice provides: "Since the death
penalty differs from other criminal penalties in its finality, defense counsel in a capital
case should respond to this difference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the
accused:' STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.2(c) (1994); see also ABA GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
(1989); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Differ-
ent?, 42 MERCER L. REv. 695 (1991).56 See Joseph Hoffmann, Starting from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Habeas Review of
Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 133, 146 (1992). Hoffmann describes the
ongoing cycle of successive habeas petitions as the "hallmark" of post-conviction litiga-
tion. He reports:
[T]he State sets an execution date, even if it knows that the execution will not
actually take place, because this is the only way to make the prisoner use up his
federal claims by filing a habeas petition and requesting a stay. After the petition
is filed, the habeas court grants a stay so it will have sufficient time to resolve
the claims. If the court rejects the claims, the State sets another execution date,
and the cycle resumes.
Id. at 146.
57See Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 50, at 8 (discussing "high gear" litigation
efforts to "forestall" execution dates).
58STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-1.3(d) (1994).
59 See-Wollan, supra note 51, at 106 (maintaining that "the interest of the client in a
capital case is often not in acceleration but in delay").
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Congress and the federal judiciary. Distinguishing illegitimate claims and
parsing frivolous issues compel lawyers to engage in vexing categorical
definition and delicate line-drawing, yet congressional and judicial critics
demand absolutist solutions to post-conviction delay. Congressional criti-
cism centers on the liberality of rules controlling state and federal habeas
practice, particularly the timing and repetition of filings. 60 Judicial re-
proach emphasizes "abusive delay" and "last-minute attempts to manipu-
late the judicial process."'6' Judges cite a "pattern of calculated efforts to
frustrate valid judgments"62 and to block executions at great time and
expense. 63 Denouncing the dilatory filing of successive habeas petitions
as a "regrettable fact"64 typical of post-conviction capital proceedings,
they upbraid defense counsel for making a "mockery" of the criminal
justice system.
65
Abolitionists concede that post-conviction litigation "is uniquely rough
and tumble, with many of the trappings of judicial decorum suspended
66
Moreover, judges acknowledge that "some last minute claims are 'sham."' 67
Neither admission aids in resolving the disputed legitimacy or merit of a
post-conviction appeal of constitutional claims taken "at the last mo-
ment"68 to stay a scheduled execution date. Even when short-lived, the
stay serves to "buy the inmate time, sometimes as little as five hours and
sometimes as much as years. 69 The stay also may serve to introduce
potentially favorable doctrinal and legislative developments in various
state and federal fora.
70
For abolitionists, the problem of last-ditch appeals is exacerbated by
the fact-specific nature of capital cases. This particularistic character gives
6°Since 1986, congressional sponsors have introduced more than 80 bills proposing a
statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 64
U.S.L.W. 4245, 4250 app. (Apr. 1, 1996); see also Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas
Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. REP.
3239 (1989).
61 Gomez v. United States District Court, 112 S. Ct. 1652, 1653 (1992) (per curiam).
62Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
63See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991).64Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 n.7 (1992); see also Franklin v. Lynaugh,
860 F.2d 165, 166 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing counsel's "[d]eliberate withholding of claims
until the eleventh hour" to be a "standard tactic" in post-conviction capital proceedings).65Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66 Michael Mello, Another Attorney for Life, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS
ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 51, at 81.
67Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme Court, The Death Penalty, and the Harris Case,
102 YALE L.J. 205, 220 (1992).681d. at 217-18.
69 Mello, supra note 66, at 85. The strategic logic behind the filing of the appeal hinges
on the likely issuance of a stay to allow reasoned consideration of the merits of the claims.
Cast routinely in the form of a successive habeas corpus petition, the appeal may assert
the defendant's innocence, allude to newly discovered evidence, or introduce innovative
scientific procedures for evaluating past or proffered evidence.70 Wollan, supra note 51, at 104. Wollan comments: "In a field as fast-moving as death
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rise to protracted disputes over evidence gathering involving matters of
admissibility, preclusion, and the quality of evidentiary argument.71 By
pressing these disputes on appeal, abolitionists "end up re-trying facts,
arguing that little mistakes in particular factual contexts might have shifted
the perception of the overall factual context" 72 Mistakes generate infer-
ences of prejudice, thereby undermining the reliability of the verdict and
the sentence of the trial court below.
Although historically useful in forestalling and sometimes averting
execution, the strategy of delay seems to be deteriorating in effectiveness.
In fact, this second strategic prong of abolitionist politics appears increas-
ingly counterproductive, provoking both congressional antipathy and ju-
dicial animosity. This collective enmity is nowhere more pronounced than
in the areas of federal habeas corpUS73 and federal legal assistance.74 Lost
amid this procedural rancor is the moral substance of abolitionist claims.
The transformation of moral politics into the instrumental politics of
strategic mitigation and delay contributes to this loss. The next Section
assesses a second wave of instrumental strategies to salvage that loss by
encoding mitigation and delay in an alternative constitutional and ethical
discourse.
penalty law, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish today's 'good faith argument' from
tomorrow's 'frivolous' argument, and vice versa. What today seems absurd may persuade
a judge tomorrow or another judge down the corridor today." Id.
71 See Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
535, 539 (1995).721d. at 540.
730n April 24, 1996, Congress enacted legislation reforming federal habeas corpus
procedures under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2261-2266 (1996)). Title
I of the Act limits the filing, appeal, and review of habeas petitions in captial cases.
On May 3, 1996, in Felker v. Turpin, 64 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 3, 1996) (May 3,
1996) (mem.), the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and a writ of certiorari to
review the constitutionality of Title I of the Act.
For a prior history of the judicial dismantlement of habeas corpus protections, see
Barry Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. Rv.
485 (1995); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1997 (1992); James S. Liebman,
More than "Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990/1991).
74Congress recently voted to defund federal Community Defender Organizations
created by statute in 1988. See H.R. 3019, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (declaring funds
unavailable after Apr. 1, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H1958 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (same);
142 CONG. REC. S2441, 2450 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (same). Congress created these
organizations to provide representation, assistance, information, and other related services
to eligible persons and appointed attorneys in connection with federal habeas corpus
proceedings commenced to challenge state capital convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1995).
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II. Second Wave Moral Politics: Instrumental Strategies of Effective
Assistance
The second wave of the abolitionist campaign to transform moral
politics into an instrumental politics of strategic mitigation and delay
occurs through the medium of an alternative constitutional and ethical
discourse. At issue is the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and the nature
of effective legal assistance in capital cases. Surveying the ventured trans-
formation of constitutional and ethical realms uncovers the tendency of
abolitionist judgments to silence the moral voice of capital defendants and
death row inmates.
A. Constitutionalizing Effective Assistance
The abolitionist strategy of establishing an affirmative duty of coun-
sel under the Eighth Amendment to present mitigation evidence at trial75
and to delay post-conviction proceedings in order to recapitulate or sup-
plement mitigation-linked evidence collapses under the Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence of effective legal assistance in capital cases. Abolitionists
contend that the "quality" of counsel, rather than the crime itself, largely
determines the imposition of the death penalty.76 Unfortunately, they find
incompetent representation by capital counsel to be pervasive.77
The literature of the abolitionist bar indicates widespread constitu-
tional condemnation of the quality of legal assistance in capital cases.78
75 Abolitionists mention that the strategy of mitigation applies to both the guilt and
penalty phases of capital proceedings. See Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986). Goodpaster cautions:
A capital case defense attorney, who tries the capital case guilt phase without
regard to its potential effects on the penalty phase trial, may effectively condemn
his client to a death sentence. Such an attorney is not aware that some guilt phase
defenses are seriously inconsistent with an affirmative penalty phase case for life.
Id. at 84-85.
76Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
77 Id, at 1837. Bright states: "[Ala large part of the death row population is made up
of people who are distinguished by neither their records nor the circumstances of their
crimes, but by their abject poverty, debilitating mental impairments, minimal intelligence,
and the poor legal representation they received." Id. at 1840.78 See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245 (1991); David R. Dow, Teague
and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 23, 50-72 (1991); Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from
Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71 Thx. L. REv. 1131, 1155-57
(1993); Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 283-84
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Abolitionists buttress their denunciations with evidence of inadequate
state and federal funding,7 9 bureaucratic disincentive, 0 meager fee com-
pensation,81 and deficient lawyering 8 2 Yet, the highly deferential standard
of effective representation announced in Strickland v. Washington 3 ac-
cords defense counsel a strong presumption that his conduct at trial or
sentencing lies within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance.8 4 Overcoming that presumption requires a showing that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness prejudi-
cial to a just and reliable sentencing result.
8 5
Under Strickland, the proper measure of performance in representation
refers to a standard of reasonableness appraised under prevailing professional
norms.16 These norms purportedly preserve "the ability of counsel to make
independent decisions about how to conduct the defense "'87 Because that
independence is constitutionally protected, counsel consequently enjoys wide
latitude in making "tactical" decisions.88 Such leeway renders the strategic
choices and judgments of counsel "virtually unchallengeable.'
8 9
(1994); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN. L. REv. 461 (1987).
79See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HoMICmE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864-1982 337, 348-53 (1984); Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving
Alabama's Capital Defense Problems: It's a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REv. 1
(1992).
80 See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 468
(1995) (citing public defender's fear of incurring race-based community hostility); Panel
Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel Competency and Due Process in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1105, 1117 (1994) (David R. Dow, noting "systematic
pressure not to litigate aggressively" in order to secure future appointments); see also
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 399 (commenting that state attorneys appointed under
voluntary assignment schemes "are frequently underfunded, inexperienced, unsympathetic
to their clients, and thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense during either
the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial").
81 See Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-
Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 281
(1991).
82 See Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims
in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA. L.
REv. 679, 680 (1990); Stephen B. Bright, I Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights
on Behalf of Poor Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo.
L. REV. 849, 858 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction, The Meaning of "Counsel" in
the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 433, 491 (1993).
3466 U.S. 668 (1984).
84 1d. at 689.
S5See id. at 687-88, 692-96.
861d. at 688.
871d. at 686.
81 d. at 689; see Green, supra note 82, at 502 n.284 (explaining that "decisions about
the content of opening statements and summations, about what evidence to introduce,
about what objections to make, and about how to conduct cross-examination, are presumed
to be strategic").
89Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; see Bright, supra note 76, at 858; Richard Klein, The
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Nevertheless, abolitionists challenge Strickland's presumption of ef-
fective assistance.9 Rejecting the teaching that "the purpose of the effec-
tive assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the
quality of legal representation,"91 they ratchet up the Strickland standard
of reasonableness to require the development and presentation of mitigat-
ing evidence at trial,92 even urging a policy of open admissibility to gain
lesser sentences.93 Federal and state courts, however, ordinarily rebuff
claims of ineffective assistance judged by heightened standards,94 notwith-
standing defense counsel's failure to investigate or to present mitigating
evidence.
95
Abolitionists similarly ratchet up the Strickland standard of reason-
ableness to require the development and retrial of mitigating as well as
exculpating evidence on post-conviction appeal. To support this expansive
reading, they cite the federal habeas corpus statutory grant of "adequate
representation" in post-conviction proceedings. 96 In McFarland v. Scott,9 7
the Supreme Court approved this grant, announcing the "mandatory right"
Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 634 (1986); Ellen
Kreitzberg, Death Without Justice, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 485, 500 (1995). Echoing
Bright, Kreitzberg notes that "[rieviewing courts uphold the performance of counsel when
the court is able to attribute any conceivable strategy to the performance, even if there is
no evidence that the attorney pursued that particular strategy" Id. (citation omitted).90 Bright charges that the presumption of competence is misplaced "where the accused
is represented by counsel who lacks the training, experience, skill, knowledge, inclination,
time, and resources to provide adequate representation in a capital case:' See Bright, supra
note 76, at 863.
91 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
92See Bright, supra note 80, at 459 (asserting counsel's "obligation to investigate the
life and background of the client in order to introduce mitigating evidence"); Kreitzberg,
supra note 89, at 493 (underscoring counsel's duty "to investigate and assemble all
possible evidence about a defendant's life"); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINT-
MENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES §§ 11.4.2, 11.7.1,
11.8.2-.3, 11.8.6, 11.9.3 (1989); Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital
Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the
Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987).
93 See Robert A. Kelly, Applicability of the Rules of Evidence to the Capital Sentencing
Proceeding: Theoretical and Practical Support for Open Admissibility of Mitigating
Infonnation, 60 UMKC L, REv. 411 (1992); see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979)
(per curiam).
94 Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 422 (1995) (reporting evidence of "a
substantial drop in findings of ineffective assistance of counsel in capital cases over the
past decade").95 See Green, supra note 82, at 502 (citation omitted) (finding that "courts frequently
reject ineffective assistance claims premised on defense counsel's failure to present a case
at the sentencing proceeding or even to investigate the possibility of a defense"); Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 19, at 421 (noting that "it is commonplace in many states for trial
counsel to fail to present any evidence or argument at all during the punishment phase of
a capital trial").
9621 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1995).
97 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
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of indigent capital defendants to "qualified" legal counsel under the pro-
visions of the federal habeas corpus statute.98 The right to "quality legal
representation," according to McFarland, extends to preapplication legal
assistance in capital habeas corpus proceedings. 99 This right, however,
fails to entitle capital defendants to an automatic stay of execution. To the
contrary, McFarland teaches that a "dilatory" capital defendant who "in-
excusably ignores" the opportunity to request the appointment of habeas
counsel in a timely manner and "flouts" the process available to seek such
remedial assistance implicitly waives his rights and may properly suffer
the denial of a stay of execution. 100
To abolitionists, the different character of last-minute capital appeals
warrants formulation of a test for undue delay tied to the potential merit
or substantiality of a capital defendant's legal claims, not to his construc-
tive or implied waiver of such claims. No doubt, claims exhibiting a
substantial question of innocence, new evidence, or constitutional viola-
tion merit reasonable delay. But to abolitionists, claims manifesting any
question germane to these findings deserve delay. That such claims wholly
or partly emerge out of mixed motive or manipulation strikes abolitionists
as inconsequential.101 For the abolitionist cause, the immorality of death
dictates an end-game strategy of delay: "To win time is to win."102 Yet, at
the same time, delay may invite claim preclusion and death. Defeated in
the two-fold effort to constitutionalize and to codify in habeas corpus
statutes capital counsel's strategic duty of mitigation and mitigation-linked
delay, abolitionists look to ethical commands.
B. Professionalizing Effective Assistance
Post-Strickland abolitionist litigation strategies espouse a moral poli-
tics intertwined with an instrumental account of ethics and professional-
ism. Standard renditions of this account suggest a higher obligation to
pursue strategies of mitigation and delay both at trial and on post-convic-
tion review. Justifications of this stringent, ethical obligation in death
penalty cases rely on familiar, and indeed, recurrent due process and equal
protection principles. The death-is-different rationale 0 3 implicates due
process interests.10 4 Evidence of racial discrimination in prosecution and
9
81d. at 2571.
99 d. at 2572.
100Id. at 2573; accord Duffey v. Lehman, No. 94-9003, 1996 U.S. App. WL 13154
(3d Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (opinion vacated on grant of rehearing en banc, Feb. 12, 1996).
101 Cf. Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton
Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225, 240 (1992) (opposing manipulation of court procedures to
delay death penalty).
10 2 Mello, supra note 66, at 85.
103 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
104See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214-15 (1971); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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sentencing 05 triggers equal protection concerns. 106 Spurred by the crimi-
nal defense mandate of zealous advocacy, 10 7 abolitionists apply these prin-
ciples to deduce a fundamental ethical obligation of mitigation and delay
in capital cases outside the jurisprudence of the Sixth Amendment.
Founding the abolitionist duty of mitigation and delay on ethical
rather than constitutional grounds provides little guidance to death penalty
defense lawyers. Even when equipped to investigate and to proffer miti-
gating evidence, counsel may be unable to obtain his client's consent to
pursue a victim-based strategy of mitigation at trial or on appeal. Given
the client's troubled psychosocial history, counsel may doubt not only his
ability to procure, but also the client's capacity to grant such consent. 08
Absent a clear-cut mechanism of or procedure for consent, counsel may
shun the matter entirely, treating the strategies of mitigation and delay as
tactical decisions delegated to his own independent discretion. 10 9
Construing the litigation strategies of mitigation and delay as prop-
erly delegated judgments of lawyer discretion misleads abolitionists in
fashioning a political ethos. The notion of delegated discretion licenses
counsel simply to override the objections of capital defendants and death
row inmates. Discretionary override makes no inquiry into the manner or
content of client objections. It provides no means to engage death penalty
volunteers in dialogue over the merits of delay, ignoring issues of deci-
sion-making competence and voluntary dismissal or waiver. It supplies no
mode to address the dignity-based objections of defendants and inmates
directed toward the preparation and presentation of mitigation evidence,
denying the risk and gravity of harm to client moral identity. And it
furnishes no method to integrate or to reconcile legal narratives of indi-
U.S. 153, 195-96 n.47 (1976); see also CHARLES L. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 17-107 (1981).
105See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
1°6 See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990);
SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); Bowers, supra note 79, at 193-269; see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING-RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990).
107See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101, EC 7-1 (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983). For strong and weak
defenses of this mandate, see Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The
Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687 (1991);
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993).
108 Lacking expertise, time, and resources, defense counsel may be unable to prepare
and to present mitigation evidence regarding psychosocial theories of victimization.
109 For a justice-based defense of lawyer discretion, see William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
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vidual responsibility and scientific narratives of societal responsibility at
trial and on appeal. Wedded to a theory of instrumental politics, the ethic
of discretionary override finds justification in the tragic necessity of the
abolitionist craft and its silencing judgment. The tragedy of the abolition-
ist practice vision lies in this accommodation to silence, in the accommo-
dation to violence. 110
C. Judgments of Effective Assistance
The theory of instrumental politics underlying the proposed aboli-
tionist ethic of mitigation and delay arouses troubling questions that go
beyond the debate about the scope of the mitigation requirement at the
penalty phase of capital trials or the legitimacy of intentional delay at
post-conviction proceedings. While this debate continues, the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments concerning
defense counsel's de minimis representational duties seems well settled.
Left open are issues traditionally considered outside the reach of consti-
tutional regulation: ethical obligation and moral vision. Resolution of
these issues will determine the future politics of abolitionist lawyering.
Abolitionists defend the ethical judgment to employ determinist scien-
tific discourse and attendant victimization narratives on the ground of
rhetorical function: the narratives establish "a reason for showing mercy.""'
Fulfilling the duty of presenting mitigating narratives demands "extensive
and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family his-
tory?"' 2 To conduct that investigation, abolitionists contend, "a lawyer
must be comfortable working with the client, the client's family, and the
client's friends.'11 3 Rapport allegedly facilitates the attorney-client rela-
tionship by encouraging "cooperation and the disclosure of compelling
mitigating evidence that might not be found by a less skillful attorney."
' " 4
But, the circumstances at trial and on appeal militate against building
lawyer-client rapport. Consider Michael Mello's recollection of the con-
straints of post-conviction litigation. Mello recalls "often meet[ing] the
inmate for the first time when the execution date has been set for the
forthcoming month."' "5 Stirred by the "urgency of an impending execution
date," he concedes the impulse to "get to know the inmate fast and gain
"()See Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233, 1241 (1992).
' Sarat, supra note 36, at 41.
" 2 Robbins, supra note 49, at 63.
" 3Bright, supra note 80, at 459.
" 4 Bright, supra note 76, at 1864.
15Mello, supra note 66, at 84. Mello notes that "[t]he first step in most postconviction
efforts is to compile a complete life history of the inmate. Often the information needed
is of the most intimate sort and may require the inmate to confront and share painful
feelings and long-buried memories." Id.
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his trust," and thus "sometimes [to] force[] trust and closeness at an
accelerated pace
"'1 t 6
Like other abolitionists, Mello declines to explain how to build rap-
port or trust with a client under the exigent circumstances of trial and
appellate death penalty proceedings. His silence illustrates a structural
failing in the abolitionist politics of law: the absence of client voice.
Without the voice of the capital client, the instrumental or necessitarian
justification of the litigation strategies of mitigation and delay contains
no logical stopping point, no line of excess or boundary-crossing into
illegitimacy 1 7 Hence, when abolitionist litigation gives rise to the cultur-
ally produced identity of the death row victim/sociopath, no objection is
heard. In fact, no one is able, much less permitted, to object. This silence
conforms to the hierarchical nature of lawyer-client discourse in aboli-
tionist litigation.
Abolitionists'acknowledge the impact of legal discourse on litigation
outcomes, especially the influence of story and narrative on juries and the
media. But, they evade the full import of a constructionist analysis," 8
diminishing the extent to which legal processes construct social meaning
and produce clients' cultural identity in capital cases. 1 9 Elsewhere I have
suggested that criminal defense stories of black-on-white racial violence
construct the racial identity of young black males in terms of bestiality
and pathology. 20 Allied with criminal defense lawyers, abolitionists im-
plement constructionist strategies unbridled by the moral ramifications of
constituting the criminal subject in the cultural image of a victim/so-
ciopath.
Abolitionists view this construction as a narrative necessity, even
though the notion of human dignity anchors the individualization require-
ment in Furman. Denying capital clients the cognitive, volitional, or
moral capacity to act complies with the scientific discourse of victimiza-
tion.' 2 ' To the extent that legal discourse can "neither fully contain nor
explain the lawless violence" experienced by capital defendants, 122 the
1161d.
117 On the ambiguity of legitimacy in legal advocacy, see George E. Bisharat, Courting
Justice? Legitimation in Lawyering under Israeli Occupation, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
349 (1995); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRy 407 (1995).
11 See Carol J. Greenhouse, Constructive Approaches to Law, Culture, and Identity,
28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1231 (1994); Elizabeth Mertz, A New Social Constructionism for
Sociolegal Studies, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1243 (1994).
t19 See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the
Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547, 548-49 (1995).
120See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301
(1995).
12 1 See J. Michael Echevarria, Reflections on O.J. and the Gas Chamber, 32 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 491, 526 (1995) (challenging the notion of free will as applied to certain
types of criminally deviant behavior).
122Sarat, supra note 36, at 44.
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resort to scientific, determinist discourse seems sensible, particularly given
the complexity of victimization histories.123 Scientific discourse, however,
may dissipate a proffered explanation of violence or "locate it outside the
acting subject."'124 In this way, scientific narratives chronicling the psycho-
biography' 25 "of an abused person enacting his abuse"1 26 may prove dam-
aging or otherwise futile. The next Section considers the availability of
alternative forms of discourse.
m. Reconstructing Moral Politics
Reconstructing the instrumental politics of abolitionist litigation re-
quires a revised moral discourse guided by the norms of client agency
and community. The purpose of this discourse is to make the violence and
pain of a capital defendant's life story "knowable"'127 through a narrative
that "explains but does not excuse" the lawbreaking act at issue.128 The
call for revision stems from the recognition that the contexts of capital
trial and post-conviction proceedings, and the corollary strategies of miti-
gation and mitigation-linked delay, limit the language of pain and the
evidence of moral agency available to abolitionists. Pain in these contexts
is consigned to a rhetoric of defendant deviance. 129 Proof of moral agency
is often altogether absent.130 This twin deficiency requires abolitionists to
search out an alternative discourse of moral anguish and experience ac-
cessible to the community of judges, jurors, and prosecutors that surround
capital proceedings.
123 Costanzo and Peterson elucidate this complexity in their summary of victimization
stories. See Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 44, at 143. They report:
Defenders tell a complex and textured story. The defendant is a tragically flawed
character, emotionally and socially deformed by years of neglect and abuse. The
origins of his violent behavior can be traced back to early life experiences as well
as to the forces acting on him at the time of the crime (e.g., drug addiction,
domination by others, emotional stress). According to this version of the story,
the causes of his crimes are complex-the product of multiple determinants.
Id.
124 Sarat, supra note 36, at 45.
125The term belongs to Costanzo and Peterson. See Costanzo & Peterson, supra note
44, at 143.
126Sarat, supra note 36, at 46.27Sarat, supra note 35, at 1123.
128Sarat, supra note 36, at 41.
129Haney, supra note 119, at 549.
130Even when present, such proof is distorted by the cognitive and interpretive
frameworks of judges and jurors that narrow their perception and comprehension of moral
action.
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A. Moral Discourse
The formulation of an alternative discourse that connects capital
defendants to the death penalty community in moral opposition to state-
sanctioned killing hinges on transforming the meaning of violence. Austin
Sarat describes a conception of violence dominant in capital proceedings
that obscures defendants' common experience of abuse and poverty.131 To
contest this dominant conception, Sarat advocates "the construction of a
more complex narrative of causation and accident" that elucidates the
"mixed lives and mixed motives" of capital defendants guilty of commit-
ting lawbreaking acts. 32 The task of advocacy is to capture in language
accessible to judges and juries the "diffuse" psychological, physical, and
social violence 33 pervading defendant life histories, and accordingly, con-
tributing to the performance of acts of lawbreaking.
Recounting individual histories of abuse and poverty requires a thick
description of narrative. Yet narratives of deprivation slip easily into nar-
ratives of excuse, relocating criminal responsibility and moral account-
ability beyond the reach of capital defendants. Abolitionists often point
to exculpating "factors beyond the [defendant]'s control, such as mental
illness or a childhood of extreme abuse or neglect,"' 3 4 exhorting jurors to
consider "the person behind the crime" and to evaluate "the crime in
context.' 35 These exhortations, however, falsely assume the narrative com-
patibility of explanation, excuse, and responsibility. Although mitigation
histories are not excuses, 13 6 they run afoul of the "strong desire" found
among jurors "to fix personal responsibility on the defendant, to make
him a moral agent capable of being held to account for what otherwise
seemed unaccountable actions."'
37
The tensions embedded in the abolitionist narratives of explanation,
excuse, and responsibility spring from the oppositions internal to liberal
legalism. Critical Legal Studies scholars map the doctrinal oppositions
suffusing substantive criminal law, citing the instability of the present
intentionalism/determinism dichotomy. 38 Like any practice of criminal
defense advocacy, abolitionist litigation is organized around this dichot-
omy, and accordingly, is framed as "the choice between intentionalistic
13' Sarat, supra note 36, at 42, 52.
132 Id. at 52.
1331d. at 23.
134Mello, supra note 66, at 83.
135Sarat, supra note 36, at 40.
136Haney, supra note 119, at 560-61.
'"7Sarat, supra note 35, at 1128.
138See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981); see also Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism
in Law and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical
Criminology, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502 (1993).
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and deterministic accounts of human conduct."1 39 Abolitionists ratify this
choice, elevating the determinist excuse of victimization-based diminished
capacity over the blameworthy intentionalism of free will.
Privileging a determinist interpretation of lawbreaking behavior de-
values intentionalistic norms. As a result, abolitionist efforts to portray
the capital defendant as a human being endowed with positive qualities
and to show that his capital crimes "are humanly understandable in light
of his past history and the unique circumstances affecting his formative
development"140 consistently falter. They falter in part because the lan-
guage employed to demonstrate that a defendant "is not solely responsible
for what he is"' 141 suppresses the norm of moral agency, rendering the task
of conceptualizing and legitimizing mercy even more difficult.
142
B. Moral Agency
Imagining an alternative moral discourse appropriate to abolitionist
litigation depends on the reaffirmation of moral agency. Too often aboli-
tionists speak not of moral action but of "individual differences in resil-
ience and coping ability?' 143 Experience suggests that this narrative gives
judges and jurors too little reason for showing mercy to capital defen-
dants.
139 See Kelman, supra note 138, at 596 (explaining intentionalism and determinism as
constructs that pervade the substantive criminal law). Kelman explains:
Intentionalism is the principle that human conduct results from free choice. An
intentionalist interpretation of an incident gives moral weight to autonomous
choice and expresses the indeterminacy of future actions. Determinism, on the
other hand, implies that subsequent behavior is causally connected to prior events.
A determinist interpretation considers behavior by looking backward, and it
expresses no moral respect or condemnation of these predetermined acts.
Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted).
140Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 335 (1983).
141Id. at 335.
142Haney, supra note 46, at 1227. Haney observes:
[W]e seem to have become a society that has, at this time in our history, a very
difficult time conceptualizing and legitimizing compassion, mercy, charity, and
understanding-all concepts that are intertwined with mitigation but which now
have become terribly hard for our citizens to define, harder to assert, and virtually
impossible to connect to something resembling a principled point of view.
Id.
143 Costanzo & Peterson, supra note 44, at 136. Haney adds:
particularly in the case of powerful risk factors and traumatic life experiences
like chronic poverty and childhood maltreatment, different kinds of behavior-
behavior that "not everybody" engages in the same way-must be understood as
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Talk of moral agency is found in David Luban's conception of mor-
ally activist lawyering, 144 here derived from the principle of shared law-
yer-client moral accountability. Luban posits the notion of the lawyer's
obligation "to engage the client in moral dialogue, to attempt not merely
to save the client from the consequences of her deeds but to transform
and redeem her."145 For the abolitionist, the charge of moral redemption
encompasses the client, the judge, and the jury. Consistent with the con-
stitutional jurisprudence of the death penalty, abolitionists must invigorate
not only jurors' obligation to impose a sentence based on "a reasoned
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime"' 146
but also judges' empathic duty to evaluate that response on post-convic-
tion review. Invigoration entails exploding the victimization/agency di-
chotomy embedded in the trial strategy of mitigation and reintegrating
moral agency into the post-conviction strategy of delay, emphasizing
throughout the capital proceedings the defendant's human vulnerability to
both good and bad motive 4 7 and the possibility of redemption. 48
Moral redemption occurs through story. Milner Ball suggests that
"law depends fundamentally on story for its meaning and legitimacy. ' 149
Ball explains that an attorney "forms the story of his client, first for
himself and then for judges and juries, by discerning and emphasizing or
deemphasizing given elements under the influence of earlier courtroom
stories. ' 50 Story, in this way, is a medium through which "a lawyer
understands, makes sense of, and presents a case."' 151
variation in adapting, coping, and struggling to survive a set of circumstances
that few if any have "chosen" to endure.
Haney, supra note 119, at 592.
144 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 162 (1988).
145 Id. at 163. Luban evaluates this principle against the practice tradition illustrated
by the "lawyer for the damned:' Id. at 166. For Luban, the lawyer for the damned "takes
on those cases that no one else will come near, cases in which the client has for one reason
or another rightly become odious or untouchable in the eyes of mankind." Id. at 162..Here,
I extend his analysis to the abolitionist lawyer.
146 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (citations omitted).
147On the contextual meaning of good and bad client moral character, see Jane M.
Spinak, Reflections on a Case (Of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1990, 2078 (1995)
(urging advocates "to break down stereotypical notions of 'good' or 'bad' mothers in order
to represent them" in context). See also Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" in Law and
Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992).
148 See Helen Prejean, Capital Punishment: The Humanistic and Moral Issues, 27 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1 (1995).
1
49
MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW 143 (1993).
1
50
MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC
VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 23 (1981).
151 Id. Ball cautions that "stories require good listeners as well as good tellers if they
are to have effect:' BALL, supra note 149, at '144. Stories, he admonishes, "cannot gather
'illing hearers among us if we do not have ears to hear." Id. Thus, for Ball, there is a
"limit to the power of stories in law." Id.
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Abolitionist mitigation strategies illustrate the deployment of story to
identify the rights of capital defendants. But story, as Robin West points
out, may also mark responsibility. 52 To the extent possible, abolitionists
must employ stories to render the capital defendant's world of human
rights and responsibilities accessible to the judge and jury. Opening ac-
cess to that shared world reconstitutes moral community by encouraging
judges and juries to forgive, and thereby negate the capital defendant's
act of immorality. The interpretive key is to tell stories of moral agency
highlighting defendants' acceptance of blame and confession of responsi-
bility for lawbreaking.
C. Moral Community
To regain moral community, abolitionists must confront the preva-
lence of moral silence and exile in capital proceedings. Even when the
capital defendant's silence at trial is rooted in a history of oppression and
fear,153 jurors may infer moral guilt,154 and in opting for death, expel the
defendant as a moral outcast. Similarly, even though a defendant's history
of class or racial victimization supplies an explanation for criminal law-
breaking violence, jurors may adversely conflate such an explanation with
moral excuse, and in voting for death, banish the defendant as a moral
pariah. It is essential, therefore, to sustain the defendant's moral voice
and to maintain his moral credibility with the jury.
155
To that end, abolitionists must look for opportunities in capital trials
and appeals to develop unimagined relations156 and to devise empathic
procedures157 that reveal a double vision of the defendant as a subject and
152West, supra note 15, at 161.
153 Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis trace silence to experiences of oppression
and fear. See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 885 (1995).
154 See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 99 (1995).
155 Cf. Kreitzberg, supra note 89, at 489. Kreitzberg comments:
From the outset of the case, defense counsel needs to devise a common theme or
strategy that effectively links the guilt and penalty phases. Counsel's challenge is
to maintain credibility with jurors during the penalty trial, even after a guilty
verdict is returned in the guilt trial.
Id.
156See Maureen Cain, Horatio's Mistake: Notes on Some Spaces in an Old Text, 22
J. L. & Soc'Y 68, 75 (1995). Cain remarks:
[L]ike discourse, social relations exist powerfully in a state of radical and
uncaused autonomy. What is needed, therefore, methodologically, is a mapping
of the articulations between relationships and knowledge/discourse or, if you will,
between discourse and the extra-discursive.
Id. at 75.
157 See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
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a subjected other in command of partial moral agency, 15 and furthermore,
communicate a vision of common moral obligation held equally among
the defendant, judge, and jury.159 A vision of moral agency, Cynthia Bowman
and Elizabeth Mertz maintain, affords a client "an opportunity to name
her own experiences" and stimulates "the development of a self-authored
life story."'160 Authorship, Bowman and Mertz stress, encourages a client's
"sense of agency."'16
A vision of common moral obligation espouses love. Liberation theolo-
gists find the "heart of the human community" in the spiritual "duality of
love for the self and the other.'" 62 Love builds community by promoting
the development of empathic understanding. The focus of love is the spirit
of human reconciliation, in this case the reconciliation of the judge, jury,
and capital defendant.
63
In that spirit, abolitionists must reimagine the role of the death pen-
alty defense lawyer as a transmitter of community norms,164 rather than
solely as a prophet engaging the law of capital punishment in an ethical
and jurisprudential process of struggle. 165 They must adopt a discourse of
community,166 despite the spiritual difficulty of realizing a loving or mer-
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
Rpv. 1103 (1992); Lynn Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987).
158See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 346 (1995).
159On the ethical duty to advise clients of their moral connection to third parties and
communities, see Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the
Lawyer's Duty to Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REv. 901, 933 (1995); Stephen
L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and
Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1598 (1995).
160See Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal
Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549, 628 (1996).
161Id. at 627. Bowman and Mertz note that "therapists treating incest survivors
repeatedly stress the importance of returning agency, authority, and decision-making power
to the client." Id.
162 Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Political Theory and Liberation Theology: The Intersection
of Unger and Gutidrrez, 11 J. L. & RELIGION 63, 66 (1994-95).
1631d. at 68. Araujo draws on liberation theology "to reconcile human beings so that
injustice and oppression caused by people and institutions are replaced with a more just
society in which the dignity and the right to a flourishing human experience for all are
respected:' Id.
164 Cf Sanford Levinson, National Loyalty, Communalism, and the Professional Iden-
tity of Lawyers, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 49, 69 (1995) (positing a conception that"emphasizes the role played by the lawyer (or teacher) as a transmitter of cultural norms
and, indeed, as a model of what it might mean to conceive of oneself as a member of an
overarching political community").
165Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1331, 1333 (1995). Lobel claims that law viewed "as a process of struggle... arises from
the clash between the state seeking to enforce its rules and the activist communities
seeking to create, extend, or preserve an alternative vision of justice." Id. (citation
omitted).
166For an examination of "discourses of community" in the field of criminal justice,
see Nicola Lacey & Lucia Zedner, Discourses of Community in Criminal Justice, 22 J. L.
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ciful community of jurors. Overcoming juror anonymity167 to connect in
a disquisition about the "larger values" of moral and social citizenship' 68
addresses the "human need" 169 to construct a contextualized story of expla-
nation. The construction of story occurs through narratives of defendant
self-destruction and alteration. For the jury, this explanatory process is
therapeutic. For the abolitionist, it is pragmatic as well. Affirming the
values of agency and community empowers the jury to recognize the
capital defendant in context, restoring a sense of personhood and sympa-
thy.
Community in this respect flows from the "participatory character of
... story."170 According to Ball, story "allows for a kind of participation
in the events reproduced in the telling."'1 71 Participation in story enacts
community through inclusive narratives that humanize the violator of
community norms as both a moral agent and a victim. 172 The narratives,
West asserts, help "weav[e] the violator back into the fabric of the larger
society." 173
Abolitionists must interweave narratives of community in story to
renew the human bonds relating the judge and jury to the capital defen-
dant. By proclaiming client/community, they entreat juries to renounce
state-sanctioned killing "as much wrong for the community as for the
individual "' 174 They inspire juries to declare: "We are not that kind of
people." '17 For Ball, the work of abolitionists "has everything to do with
community, or it makes no sense at all*'
176
Contrary to Ball, striving to enact or to redeem moral community will
not remake the dehumanizing institution of the death penalty. But it may
persuade some judges and juries that the penalty of death "is a statement,
too, of the death of the society, an expression of our despair and fear. A
yielding to hopelessness. Our giving up' ' 177 As Ball suggests, the law of
& Soc'y 301, 301, 317 (1995). Lacey and Zedner note that "[c]ommunity has furnished
a discursive framework within which social policies have been conceived, designed,
implemented, and legitimated'" Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
167 But see Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of
Anonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VANDERBILT L. REV. 123, 159 (1996) (describing
anonymous juries as "an ideal compromise between the interests of jurors, defendants, and
the public in a jury free from apprehension about exposure, on the one hand, and the
interests of insuring adequate disclosure of the workings of the jury on the other").
161 Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer,
105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1523 (1996).
169Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REv. 423, 447 (1995).
170BALL, supra note 150, at 19.
17 11d.
172See West, supra note 15, at 162.
173 Id.
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capital punishment signifies a metaphor of both individual and societal
death. 78 Abolitionists must find words, find "what it is possible to say " 179
to signal this larger death and to transfigure a judge's and a jury's will-
ingness to take responsibility to avert that death.1 80 In this way, abolition-
ist lawyering enacts redemptive community.
Conclusion
Progress in law and politics, however slow and inconsistent, turns on
moral vision. The task of post-Furman abolitionist litigation is to map
that vision through the facilitation of moral discourse. Learning to speak
of moral pain in law requires a collaborative, 181 client/community-cen-
tered theory of abolitionist politics. Professing moral theory in practice is
our professional responsibility.18 2 To bear witness to the inhumanity of
capital punishment without invoking the moral authority of client and
community voices honors only the dead.
1
78
See BALL, supra note 150, at 136.
79Id. at 137 ("The more such words the lawyer finds, the more he will have made
law mean life, for his clients and therefore also for himself.").
18°See BALL, supra note 149, at 12.
181 See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths
friom Rhetoric to Practice, I CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994).
182See BALL, supra note 149, at 153 ("Where law is a medium of community, lawyers'
professional responsibility lies in developing, curing, and sustaining the communities of
which they are members.").
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